An analysis of pilot error-related aircraft accidents by Stone, R. B. et al.
N A S A C O N T R A C T O R
R E P O R T
N A S A C R - 2 4 4 4
AN ANALYSIS OF PILOT
ERROR-RELATED AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
by Nestor B. Kowalsky, Richard L. Masters,
Richard B. Stone, Gary L, Babcock,
and Eugene W. Rypka
Prepared by
DEPARTMENT OF AEROSPACE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE
LOVELACE FOUNDATION
Albuquerque, N. Mex.
jor Flight Research Center
<?
3tt
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION • WASHINGTON, D. C. • JUNE 1974
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19740018321 2020-03-23T09:04:31+00:00Z
1. Report No.
CR-24H
2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle
An Analysis of Pilot Error-Related Aircraft Accidents
5. Report Date
JUNE 1974
6. Performing Organization Code
H-827
7. Author(s)
Nestor B. Kowalsky, Richard L. Masters, Richard B. Stone,
Gary L. Babcock, and Eugene W. Rypka
8. Performing Organization Report No.
10. Work Unit No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
Department of Aerospace and Environmental Medicine, Lovelace
Foundation, Albuquerque, New Mexico
11. Contract or Grant No.
NAS4-1931
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Contractor Report
Final
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
16* Abstract
A multidisciplinary team approach to pilot error-related U.S. air carrier
jet aircraft accident investigation records successfully reclaimed hidden human
error information not shown in statistical studies. New analytic techniques
were developed and applied to the data to discover and identify multiple ele-
ments of commonality and shared characteristics within this group of accidents.
Three techniques of analysis were used: (1) Critical element analysis,
which demonstrated the importance of a subjective qualitative approach to raw
accident data and surfaced information heretofore unavailable. Using this
approach to extract and analyze causal elements, attributes, events and condi-
tions which significantly contributed or were related to the selected accidents,
a model was developed. This model was applied to training, midair, and
non-training/non-midair accidents. (2) Cluster analysis, which was an ex-
ploratory research tool that will lead to increased understanding and improved
organization of facts, the discovery of new meaning in large data sets, and the
generation of explanatory hypotheses. The technique also provides a simple "
automated straightforward means for visually presenting an otherwise un-
manageably large set of data in matrix fprm, for organizing the data, clustering
the accidents and disclosing and summarizing the structure of the matrix with a
minimum loss of information. (3) Pattern recognition, by which accidents can
be categorized by pattern conformity after critical element identification by
cluster analysis.
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s))
Pilot error accidents
Critical element analysis
Cluster analysis
18. Distribution Statement
Unclassified - Unlimited
CPU. 02
19. Security Classif. (of this report)
Unclassified
20. Security Classif. (of this page)
Unclassified.
21. No. of Pages
'-. 77
22. Price*
$4.66
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION 1
METHODOLOGY 6
ACCIDENT CRITICAL ELEMENTS 21
Critical Conditions 21
Critical Decisions 30
Associations of Critical Decisions
with Critical Conditions 38
CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ELEMENTS 40
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 46
CONCLUSIONS 54
APPENDIX A - Cluster Analysis and Pattern
Recognition - Basic Methodology 56
APPENDIX B - Cluster Analysis, .and Pattern
Recognition - Determinative and Identi-
fication Methodology 62
REFERENCES 69
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 71
iii
FIGURES
Page
1. Project Analytic Model 5
2. NTSB Aircraft Accident Analysis Sheet 8-10
3. Matrix of Characteristics, Non-Training/
Non-Midair Accidents 16
4. Clustered Characteristics, Non-Training/
Non-Midair Accidents 17
5. Clustered Characteristics, Training
Accidents 19
6. Clustered Characteristics, Midair
Accidents 19
7. Critical Conditions Screen 28
8. Clustered Critical Elements, Non-Training/
Non-Midair Accidents 41
9. Rates of Event Separation by Critical
Elements . 43
10. Reclustered Critical Elements, Non-Training/
Non-Midair Accidents 44
11. Rates of Event Separation or Partitioning 63
TABLES
Page
1. Accident Characteristics and Variables 11
2. Variables Scaling, Levels of Logic 12-15
3. Critical Condition Category Model 22-23
4. Accidents, by Phase of Operation 24
5. Critical Conditions, by Accident 25
6. Critical Decision Category Model 31-32
7. Summary of Critical Decisions, Non-
Training/Non-Midair Accidents 34
8. Summary of Critical Decisions, Training
Accidents 35
9. Summary of Critical Decisions, Midair
Accidents 36
10. Combinations of Critical Decisions, Non-
Training/Non-Midair Accidents 37
11. Optimal Separation of Events by Critical
Elements 42
12. Truth Tables 58
13. Clustering Methodology 60
14. Truth Table, Event-Versus-Event Matrix,
Multi-Valued Logic 61
15. Event-Versus-Event Matrix 64
16. Computation of S-Values 66-67
INTRODUCTION
Aircraft accidents in the United States which involve air
carrier aircraft on either revenue, training or ferry flights
receive a thoroughgoing evaluation conducted by an accident
investigation team manned by experts from the National Trans-
portation Safety Board (NTSB). The team is supplemented by
technical experts from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
other government agencies, airframe and engine manufacturers,
the airline, the airline pilot group, and other interested
parties. (Other aircraft accidents may also be investigated by
the NTSB, but are not the subject of interest in this study.)
The NTSB team performs its investigation at the site of the
accident initially, arriving at the scene as rapidly as possible.
Analysis of the information gathered at the scene and through
other sources is carried out over a period of time lasting from
days to months; results are presented to the Board and an
official report of the accident is publicly released, assigning
a cause or causes and contributing factors to the accident.
The major classification of accidents by NTSB may be grouped
into those factors related to mechanical failure (e.g. airframe,
power plant, component), environmental (e.g. weather, airport,
terrain), and those factors related to human actions (e.g. pilot/
personnel-human error). Human error has been a consistently
high category («.i«.».i«.») , with NTSB data relating cause factors for
air carrier accidents (all operations) for the period 1964-1969
indicating, for example, that pilot factor was assigned as one
of the causal factors in 58 percent of fatal accidents ( 1 ).
In fact, 55 percent of U.S. air carrier accidents continue to
involve "pilot/personnel" as a cause or factor element (6 ).
General aviation data are even more impressive with the pilot
listed as at least partially responsible in as high as 83 per-
cent of reported accidents (2 ). Applying the 58 percent
figure to the average of 30 U.S. air carrier accidents investi-
gated annually by the NTSB, it is estimated that 17 of these
are pilot error-related.*
Accident prevention is generally identified as the primary
objective of flight safety programs and policies. The primary
goal of accident investigation is to unravel in a time sequence
all the events which led up to an accident in order that some
action can be taken toward prevention of similar accidents.
Equipment or material which fails to perform the specific
function for which it is designed can generally be traced and the
*The problem of human error in maritime accidents is
receiving increasing attention. The Human Error Panel of the
Maritime Transportation Research Board, National Academy of
Sciences, is currently exploring means of identifying the nature
of human error contingencies in ship accidents ( 12) .
cause of the accident can be stated with some certainty; e.g. the
brakes failed because of loss of hydraulic pressure. There can
be and usually are a host of "contributing" factors, each of
which has an impact upon the primary cause of the accident.
Other events are involved, particularly when no critical
material failure occurs and a pilot's act of omission or com-
mission could have prevented the accident. In an accident inves-
tigation when no significant material failure is identified and
the occurrence of many contingencies are involved, the accident
is frequently classified: "primary cause - pilot error". Those
involved in analyses of accident data were the first to recognize
the limitations of using a single primary cause factor. The
analysts compiled data and published analyses of situations, con-
ditions, and places where major accidents occurred. Using this
approach, many pilot error studies were published; for example,
analysis of undershoot and overshoot accidents, midair collisions,
and disorientation accidents. While this type of study contributes
somewhat to the understanding of the factors involved and occa-
sionally provides some indication of the corrective action to be
taken, no organized or systematic approach has been used in re-
lating the many contingencies which are hidden under the term
"pilot error".
To know that no equipment failed but that the pilot committed
an error which caused or contributed to the accident is of little
consequence unless action is taken to prevent the future occurrence
of similar human error accidents. To place the blame on the pilot
does little to prevent others from committing the same error unless
design changes are instituted, procedures modified, or training
programs altered to eliminate that type of human error. Early in
accident investigation it was recognized that if similar accidents
were to be grouped, a standardized data format was essential. It
was also important to assign a primary cause factor so that like
accidents could be categorized into distinct classes, e.g. human
error accidents. From the standardization of definitions, the
artificial grouping of accidents by various criteria and the
assignment of causal factors arose some of the difficulties in
making precise statements about human error accidents. When
human error data are normalized or grouped into distinct classes,
a determinable amount of specific information is lost in that
transformation. It is easy to relate all human error accidents
identified as those in which "pilot.failed to use proper judge-
ment". However, it is not easy to show the relationship of major
situational constraints, equipment and system influences, and
decision-making (or cognitive processes) which contributed to a
"situation" resulting in the pilot's failure to use proper judge-
ment.
Review of the human error literature reveals distinct
categories of accident studies. First, there are those publica-
tions showing accident frequencies. These are "impact" studies.
The reports show how many aircraft have been destroyed or the
number of accidents which resulted in major damage. They show
numbers of fatalities or major injuries and the frequencies are
distributed by type of aircraft, hours flown, pilot experience,
time of day, length of runway, etc. Other types of publications
include case histories in which a particular accident is de-
scribed in detail. Others include study of specific problems
or failures in aircraft subsystems which occurred during flight,
focusing close attention on failures of hydraulics, navigation
systems, etc. Insufficient emphasis has been directed to the
study of human error and only a fraction of the money spent in
altering aircraft systems or correcting material failures is
invested in attempting to analyze and correct failures resulting
from human limitations.
There is a school of thought which holds that nothing can
be done to prevent the human error type of aircraft accident and
that data accumulated during accident investigations are of
limited value for establishing research programs in this area.
We feel, however, that accident data are indeed a valuable source
of human factors information and these data should be extracted
and made available to research agencies to assist in research
planning. The solution to the problem of how to utilize accident
data as a basis for human factors research is not simple. However,
the problem can be stated concisely: Accident analysis data are
not presently precise enough, and neither are they in an appro-
priate form to be used for the prediction of future human error
accidents, nor even for establishing criteria for human error
research. There have been notable exceptions such as the studies
which led to the relocation of communications equipment to pre-
vent disorientation. The U.S. Air Force has attempted to approach
the problem through the use of annual USAF Industry System Safety
Conferences dealing with research needs. The U.S. Navy has
attempted to study accident causes in the human factors field
through the medium of the Human Error Research and Analysis
Program (HERAP) ( 5,15)• A longitudinal systems approach related
mission and system requirements to human error. The purpose of
the program was "to obtain and use appropriate information con-
cerning human engineering as related to cockpit design and lay-
out, as well as lighting, communications, training, personnel
selection and assignment, and the total flight/operation environ-
ment and the interface between man and machine" (5 )• The
project was also involved in examining pilot performance in long
duration simulation studies.
Past studies of human error accidents did not generally
evolve from a systematic study of the data. The analyst, in
acquiring human error statistics, noted the occurrence of these
accidents more predominantly under certain conditions, places or
times. It was noted, for example, that a large proportion of
accidents occurred during the landing phase of flight. This
prompted interest in measuring the distance of the crash from the
end of the runway; hence, the definition of the problem of under-
shooting the runway. As a result of these studies, a host of new
problems were identified: visibility, judgement, procedures
training, and engineering requirements. The importance of this
problem-oriented approach is not questioned. However, if human
error research planning is to insure that all research require-
ments are identified, some systematic methodology must be utilized.
A piecemeal attack on human error has failed to provide the
perspective needed to approach the problem in an organized and
systematic manner. A synthesis-of the various bits of data accu-
mulated by the studies done to date could only provide a dis-
jointed and confusing result, since these•studies have for the
most part been performed for the purpose of solving a particular
problem at a particular point in time. A new approach must be
taken to reclaim the hidden human error information in accident
investigation records which is not currently shown by statistical
studies of accidents. The systems approach evolved primarily
from or along with the research and development of aeronautical
and space systems. Integral to this systems approach was the
consideration of safety.
The investigators have conducted a human factors system
analysis evaluation of certain NTSB basic accident investigation
records in order to construct a human error accident model which
allows graphic demonstration of critical event information. This
information can be utilized to establish future human factors
research programs in aeronautics. Analysis of the data also pro-
vides a basis for evaluating the adequacy of the reporting and
data-gathering format currently used in the human factors portion
of accident investigation.
With the close cooperation of the NTSB Bureau of Aviation
Safety, the Department of Aerospace and Environmental Medicine
of the Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research
has employed a systematic methodology to examine the character-
istics of the flight prior to the accident (environmental factors,
aircraft systems, pilot performance, facilities, policies and
procedures) as well as the contingencies pertaining at the time
of the accident, to afford consideration of all the elements
interfacing and interacting in the operation of a complex aero-
nautical system. The multidisciplinary research approach has
avoided the negative concept of "accident" traditionally used
(an unforeseen, unanticipated sudden event that could not be
helped). An aircraft accident has been viewed as an eminently
successful event that is inevitable when preceeded by a series of
one or more accident-enabling factors or conditions which have to
be present and without which the accident could not occur. This
approach deemphasizes pilot "fault" and focuses on the actions
and decisions, both proper and improper, that are carried out,
as well as those factors that prompt these actions and decisions.
The concept encompasses all conditions leading to accidents in the
man-machine-environment complex, including material failures, etc.
It is this concept that was used in collecting and analyzing the
critical conditions and decisions data in our study.
The aim of the study was to devise and use a new approach
to reclaim the hidden human error information in accident inves-
tigation records not currently shown by conventional statistical
studies of accidents for the purposes of:
1. establishing a human error accident system model,
2. performing an in-depth contingency analysis and
integrating these data within the framework of
the system model, and
3. developing a research planning paradigm for the
system model.
A major objective of the study was to discover and identify
multiple elements of commonality occurring in pilot error-
related accidents. Figure 1 graphically presents the analytic
model developed for this study.
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METHODOLOGY
Air carrier accident investigations are thorough and
recognized authorities in their respective fields from both
industry and government are used as members of the investigation
team. As a result, minute details about many factors impinging
upon the,-accident are reflected in the reports. It was there-
fore felt that the NTSB records on air carrier accident investi-
gations represented the most thorough and complete sources of
accident data available to us, with the highest level of expert
input.
With the close cooperation of the NTSB Bureau of Aviation
Safety, the Lovelace Foundation research team subjected certain
basic NTSB accident records to a human factors/systems analysis
evaluation. The research approach was multidisciplinary with a
team whose cumulative experience consisted of a broad background
in aircraft accident investigation, airline flying, human factors
engineering, aviation medicine, mathematics, logic and cluster
analysis and psychology.
Selected for analysis are accidents with assigned causes
involving human error for U.S. air carrier turbojet and turbofan
aircraft from 1958 through 1970. In selecting the accidents for
this retrospective study, the existing NTSB definition of the
cause factor classification of human error was neither questioned
nor challenged. We were not concerned with the primary cause
factor per se nor the findings of the accident investigation
board, nor were we interested in identifying a particular
accident by number, name or location. The primary cause factor
was used only for the purpose of selecting the basic human
error accident records for analysis. We accepted the NTSB
definition of the set.
Over 200 pilot error-related accident records were re-
viewed for U.S. air carrier jet aircraft from 1958 through 1970.
Selected for final in-depth study were 74 accidents. Criteria
for selection excluded incident reports relating to minor
accidents such as ground taxi accidents and clear air turbulence
passenger injuries, reports of which were too brief to be of
value in this study.
Data Collection
Accident data available to us in the NTSB information
storage system consisted of the basic accident investigation
record, including all the factual data, group chairman factual
reports, hearing proceedings, transcripts from cockpit voice
recorders, air traffic control recorders, flight recorder
tracings, flight crew and witness statements, weather reports,
and the accident narrative report. The NTSB computer file which
lists selected information abstracted from the records was also
utilized. Figure 2 presents the NTSB computer file format in
which data are stored in both raw and coded form. The information
collected for analysis in this study was of two major types:
accident characteristics or variables and critical element infor-
mation.
Accident Characteristics and Variables
Of over 350 possible items of data available on each
accident in the computer file, 37 were selected as having some
possible relationship to pilot error. These variables, listed
in Table 1 as variables 00 through 36, include man, machine and
environmental data. Also selected for study were certain crew-
related data not listed in .the computer file but available in
some of the records. These latter items are listed as variables
37 through 48 in Table 1. Data appearing in the computer file
were manually verified, corrected, and in some cases previously
uncoded information entered. The additional information on crew
flight time, duty time and rest periods, where available, was
extracted and listed. Accidents occurring prior to 1962 do not
appear in the NTSB computer file, and these were manually identi-
fied, searched and data abstracted. Using this data a matrix was
constructed consisting of 49 variables on each of 74 accidents.
Of a total of 3626 cells in the matrix, 583 or 16% list "no data
available", providing an information content of 84%. To this
matrix was then added the critical element information described
in other sections of this report.
The clustering methodology outlined in Appendix A was
applied to various portions of the data set. The 74 accidents
were divided into three groups: "non-training/non-midair" (56
accidents), "training" (12 accidents), and "midairs" (7 accidents).*
Table 2 lists the variables studied (by matrix column number), the
scaling used for each variable, assigned levels of logic, and a
frequency count of the logic states (by the above-noted three
accident groups). Assigned levels of logic range from "1" (high-
est level) through "5". "Not applicable" was assigned "8" and
"no data" assigned "9" (the lowest level of logic).
Figure 3 presents a matrix of data (levels of logic) on 49
variables of the 56 non-training/non-midair accidents, recorded
in the order in which the data were collected by the investigators.
The columns (variables) are ordered consecutively 00 through 48
as listed in Tables 1 and 2. The accidents (rows) were assigned
a permanent identification number, listed at the left of the
matrix in such a manner as to preserve anonymity.
Results of the clustering procedure on the data in this
group of accidents are shown in Figure 4. The numbers along the
*0ne training accident was a midair collision and is listed
in both the training and midair groups.
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*Aircraft Accident Analysis Sheet from Manual of Code Classifi-
cations, Aircraft Accidents and Incidents, National Transporta-
tion Safety Board, Department of Transportation, Washington,
D.C., June 1970, 3rd Edition.
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TABLE 1
ACCIDENT CHARACTERISTICS AND VARIABLES
00 Number of engines
01 Time of occurrence
02 Type of accident (1st)
03 Phase of operation (1st)
04 Condition of light
05 Type weather conditions
06 .Type instrument approach
07 Airport proximity
08 Airport elevation
09 Runway composition
10 Runway condition
11 Runway lighting
12 Runway length
13 Type of terrain
14 Pilots involved
15 Total flight time (1st)
16 Total flight time (2nd)
17 Hours in type (1st)
18 Hours in type (2nd)
19 Pilot age (1st)
20 Pilot age (2nd)
21 Pilot at controls
22 Sky condition
23 Ceiling
24 Visibility
25 Precipitation
26 Obstruction to vision
27 Relative wind component
28 Temperature
29 Wind velocity
30 Approach lighting availability
31 Pilot time last 24 hours (1st)
32 Pilot time last 30 days (1st)
33 Pilot time last 90 days (1st)
34 Duration of this flight (1st)
35 On duty time (1st)
36 Rest period prior to flight (1st)
37 Pilot time last 24 hours (2nd)
38 Pilot time last 24 hours (FE)
39 Pilot time last 30 days (2nd)
40 Pilot time last 30 days (FE)
41 Pilot time last 90 days (2nd)
42 Pilot time last 90 days (FE)
43 Duration of this flight (2nd)
44 Duration of this flight (FE)
45 On duty time (2nd)
46 On duty time (FE)
47 Rest period prior to flight (2nd)
48 Rest period prior to flight (FE)
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TABLE 2 (Page 1 of 4)
Matrix
Col.
NO. Variable (Characteristic)
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
-
11
12
13
14
Number of engines
Time of occurrence
Type of accident (First)
Phase of operation (First)
Condition of Light
Type weather conditions
Type of instrument approach
Airport proximity
Airport elevation (ft. )
Runway composition
Runway condition
Runway lighting
Runway length (ft .)
Type of Terrain
(off airport)
Pilot* involved
Scale
Four
Three
Two
2200-0559 hours
0600-1359 hours
1400-2159
On runway
Off runway
Midair/Cruisc/Departure
Engine failure
Landing
Approach
Inflight/Departure
Takeoff to 1st pwr. red.
Static/Ramp
Hight
Daylight
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IFR
VFR
Non- precis ion
Contact/visual
Precision
Hot applicable
No data
On airport
Under 5 miles
Over 5 miles
Not applicable
Over 2000
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Sea level - 100
Not applicable
No data
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Vet
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Other
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No data
On
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No data
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-
7
—
-
3
4
—
—
1
6
-
1
6
2
1
—
4
-
-
2
4
1
-
—
1
6
~
1
~
6
~
1
2
4
~
1
2
4
••
1
"
6
™
2
~
"
1
4
•
1
"
6
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TABLE 2 (Page 2 of 4)
Col.
No.
IS
16
17
18
19
20
514i
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Variable (Characteristic)
Total flight time (hrs.)
(Captain)
Total flight time (hrs.)
(First Officer)
Hours in type
(Captain)
Hours in type
(First Officer)
Pilot age
(Captain)
Pilot age
(First Officer)
Sky condition
Ceiling (ft.)
Visibility (mi.)
Precipitation
Obstruction to vision
Relative wind component
Temperature (°F.)
Scale
Under 6000
6000 - 15,000
Over 15,000
Under 3500
3500 - 10,000
Over 10,000
No data
0 - 500
501 - 2000
Over 2000
No data
0 - 500
501 - 2000
Over 2000
No data
Under 40
40 - 50
Over 50
No data
Under 35
>5 - 45
Over 45
No data
First Officer
Other (incl. both)
Captain
No data
Broken - Overcast
Clear - Scattered
P. obscured - Obscured
No data
Under 500
500 - 2000
Over 2000
No data
Eq/Under 1
Over 1-4
Eq/Over 5
No data
Yes
No
No data
Fog, haze
Other
None
No data
Tail
Cross
Calm
Head
Not applicable
No data
Over 70
41 - 70
0-40
Not applicable
No data
Logic
1
2
3
I
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
4
8
9
1
2
3
8
9
Non-Trng/
Midair
1
24
31
14
19
23
-
18
25
12
1
26
22
7
1
6
35
13
2
19
28
6
3
22
3
29
2
31
15
8
2
7
22
25
•2
9
12
34
1
27
27
2 .
16
1
35
4
8
11
3
21
6
7
11
13
9
4
19
Trng
1
3
8
3
5
4
-
4
4
4
-
8
2
2
-
1
10
-
1
3
6
3
-
2
8
2
-
3
7
-
2
1
1
9
1
_
3
8
1
2
9
1
3
1
6
2
1
2
1
4
1
3
3
3
1
-5
Midai
1
6
3
-3
1
3
2
2
-
5
2
-
-
1
4
1
1
3
3
-
1
2
5
-
4
3
-
-
1
1
5
-
-1
5
1
1
6
-
3
«-
3
1
1
—
—2
4
—
2
3
-
1
1
13
TABLE
Col.
No.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
2
Variable (Characteristic)
Wind velocity (knots)
Approach lighting
Pilot time last 24 hrs (hrs)
(Captain)
Pilot time last 30 days (hrs)
(Captain)
Pilot time last 90 days (hrs)
(Captain)
Duration this flight (hrs)
(Captain)
On duty time (hrs)
(Captain)
Rest period prior to flight
(hrs) (Captain)
Pilot time last 24 hrs (hrs)
(first Officer)
Pilot time last 24 hrs (hrs)
(Second Officer)
Pilot time last 30 days (hrs)
(First Officer)
Pilot time last 30 days (hrs)
(Second Officer)
Pilot time last 90 days (hrs)
(First Officer)
Pilot time last 90 days (hrs)
(Second Officer)
Duration this flight thrs)
(First Officer)
Scale
Under 10
10 - 20
Over 20
Not applicable
No data
Not available
Available
Not applicable
No data
Over 6
4 - 6
Under 4
No data
Over 70
50 - 70
Under SO
No data
Over 210
150 - 210
Under 150
No data
Over 6
3 - 6
Under 3
No data
Over 7
4 - 7
Under 4
No data
Under 12
12 - 16
Over 16
No data
Over 6
4 - 6
Under 4
No data
Over 6
4 - 6
Under 4
No data
Over 70
50 - 70
Under 50
No data
Under 70
50 - 70
Under 50
No data
Over 210
150 - 210
Under 150
No data
Over 210
150 - 210
Under 150
No data
Over 6
3 - 6
Under 3
No data
Logic
1
2
3
8
9
1
2
8
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
(Page
Non-Trng/
Midair
26
18
-
4
8
9
16
18
13
5
22
27
2
10
9
8
29
S
15
16
20
2
19
35
-
14
26
13
3
4
9
41
2
5
22
25
4
5
13
20
18
7
8
7
34
2
10
2
42
7
12
11
26
2
5
10
39
2
19
33
2
3 of
Trng
6
3
-
.
3
4
1
3
4
1
2
7
2
1
-2
9
_
-1
11
-5
4
3
_
6
3
3
.
3
6
3
1
2
4
5
_
2
4
6
_
-
-
12
.
-1
11
_
-
-
12
_
1
-
11
.
3
7
2
4)
Midair
3
2
1
1
•
1
1
4
1
_
4
2
1
1
1
-
5
-1
1
5
-1
6
-
2
3
1
1
_
3
3
1
_
4
2
1
_
3
-
4
_
2
1
4
1
-
-
6
1
-1
5
.
-
-
7
_
1
6
-
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TABLE
Col.
No.
44
45
46
47
48
2
Variable (Characteristic)
Duration this flight (hrs)
(Second Officer)
On duty time (hrs)
(First Officer)
On duty time (hrs)
(Second Officer)
Rest period prior to flight
(hrs) (First Officer)
Rest period prior to flight
(hrs) (Second Officer)
Scale
Over 6
3 - 6
Under 3
No data
Over 7
4 - 7
Under 4
No data
Over 7
4 - 7
Under 4
Mo data
Under 12
12 - 16
Over 16
No data
Under 12
12-16
Over 16
Logic
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
9
1
2
3
(Page
Non-Trng/
Midair
2
15
23
16
IS
26
12
3
11
17
10
18
4
11
37
• 4
4
7
27
4 Of
Trng
5
.
6
3
3
1
5
1
5
1
7
4
_
1
5
4)
Midair
_
1
3
3
2
3
1
1
1
2
-
4
_
3
2
2
_
2
1
No data 18
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ACCIDENTS
CHARACTERISTICS
0000000000111111111122222222223333333333444444444
0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012305678
001 1211223132113832311213321111922323223332323292221
002 1322232132223833222321233234111223323223222332233
003 1222232132223833221223223232111333223333939222233
005 1322232231222133311323233234921219333229999333333
006 1311122131123833211323121131129219212223299221122
007 1211239 1 318938 33 321 22123 32348 ti3'.>933 3339999333333
008 1311123131312832311223112H299229931122999933U11
009 1311123132112333331313132134991222223223239222233
010 1222232122992833232223133233999323333239913331323
011 1111123131113332221233112211212199113119999111133
012 1321232131292833232223233234119292312239939331122
013 1211232131222933221321133234221337333332293333333
014 2322132211993133311223133234212399333239999332393
015 1311123132213833232321123134322311223331222222233
016 1223239331992?33311229223232999312323392929392939
017 1311123132112833223323322124322323223322233222232
018 1311123132213833311211112112222339223339999222233
019 1222232132292833332311233234129119212112299221122
020 2322122131112832111213112112922299213229999221133
022 1311132121213833111211233233222993393339933333333
023 1211233132292832199211233234819399113339999111133
026 1322123221113232121213322112911322222392999222929
030 3H1123131112132121991321134322392333399912393939
031 2222223131193132122213121114922293223299919292939
032 2222223231912432111123921211212233322992999999999
033 1221233139323132223131123234119333323333233332933
035 1311133131112232322211133131112112313191929391939
037 3311232131121132312211123134912293313299939391939
040 3311239132323132321191233134919291223299939292939
041 322211323231H33321221331211219299312299999391929
042 1222223299119332222339123191992211312299999391929
043 3321132299319231122113233234911399333399999393939
046 2211233111993832111113133134229393223319999222132
049 1314224388088833312223133138288233323221113332233
050 111413«131193833332321123939228292212229923221122
051 131«134122212833132211133232318393323339922332233
053 1115124122113832222223122119318399323339999332233
054 212*12*122213832121223123132326P23311222232331111
056 1224 12«221313133333221332213318339333333399333333
057 232312*388888332323213222118218393333339923333333
060 2315134121113832122113233239118199321119999332211
064 2114134132111832322221123219118399323339999332233
067 132*234132223833233231133232213111312111111331122
069 1311229139113833222323122199999312293999999229933
070 1133128888888832211231199998998399223339999222233
071 1211223139212333222321111299999209223229999222233
078 3322128388888223211223311138888393333399939393939
080 111413813111383312122293313221839-2333339921333333
063 3344234131993132122212233239928392323339929332233
064 3322121299999233332213123112912322323391929392939
065 132412°1211131322332321131143182112232212 19222233
055 3224124122212133311213122114328222331293929393919
074 1211232119223833311993133231119992339999933333399
079 393313438888823332222312323890823222329191?292939
086 231123213122113221222323323412129939399995»999999
092 1333234388888833333321391138888299329229999332299
Figure 3. Data on 56 Non-Training'/Non-Midair accidents.
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018
008
009
035
053
015
006
Oil
051
050
on
074
013
067
033
010
ACCIDENTS
007
023
003
002
012
019
017
001
080
064
020
054
046
031
060
086
055
037
040
083
030
CHARACTERISTICS
0020021120022112431102332022431333314340344440101
702425169931007655636020417319917382768S434025564
111 11 lll{22111211223822322321992339333333222992333
1111111191132311113819922321992229221113333992233
Illlllll|??13ll33?23ag9;>l23433332:?2?2333322?292333
1111111
l l l l l l l
1111 111
•>! 1111123 113 29112331 3 2121129 2339 3339 V93233
212532121222823982192992339333332333992243
??211??3322232312330??!3331333133233222333
065 111
1 1 1 1 1 IP 1_2 1 1 3?i 1J1128 111-T13 1295 3?2''2322232222723?3
lMHJ2in 113312 1112312922 1119V2-11^1333331 nyv2233"
2411233221823933323292333323332333V23303
l|9922 14 1313311381 ?9n3192293??2232?23222?3334 3
11111
1111 IB
1 1 1 1 l
1311*231 3 1222 123 15334 11 rj?;>12533.;i23222''22'i 3'
111
111
111
Hi.
Ill
111
111
212129911222922232999129199322'223333222992333
2122119133213333831993213399992939991333933323
2122121 11 3P33 3329323 13?4 39233323 ?313 33332333?!
2222312<tl 32 33 1128121S3323112 111 132223333113 343
12222319113323222191393242331333333333333233233
222929223993313233929323319?:3 233??3323339333?3
H21l21121111213-j918329?333339293J3333i23339333?3
1172129111112823333833913243992339333333333993393
1122129912111293111818993243992339323333111993233
1122222112232223222821313222332333333333222993323
U22222212212223222821213343233223233333333223323
112222921113?233112811993343392222322223333993323
11 ?2229222211 ?33 113811103?4a9231 l9! ???23?222933?3
1131
11
11
111322132122222623222302323333223323222232333
32111122131111223829221212222333332313229332233
11 1114221233318329831 2329233233_33.333339 13383,
211121212'* 121 2 122 JO 2 1*831929923393133-'3 3339 93253
211211121231111111319922321992229223333222992223
211211122432223 1118132S3122322223231112333222243
212119121131913221312993243991333133321222993233
212219221231121221199921?47192223933393229992233
2211212115311232213219C3393991119131112333993243
722122221
11211122« 3 12 113331932?.2242232222V 211« 233999Z34 3
3I2112211111H3113199923342392?23913393339993223
322112112119323223199993343391221933393229993293
32242922l421923221129983393292332333333333993243
33111112111913333119392114 21993329?339?3399?2233
042 21122H299293129 11239912321299322 19922?9339992233
005 2122222121232213333139113343993229223333333993323
026 213121 111 123112122129921232?922332932292222992233
056 21312213114lg33133313338??3393?339333332333392343
014 2211229111232913233132V23343992329332331333y933?3
032 229222111123g9l19?14923?1?12921?939?9?93399992233
084 231121921923193122J299223322212332?933*9339992313
043 2321221219131323331299913343991339993399339993123
041 2331221 112212321 113}92991?13992?299t???333999 1333,
049 3 1121182304 323 13223822383383 1122232533-J6333 132343'
016 31222291913929132232991932222223329233'3339993393
092 3132318388312833223826981389993229289998333V93343
057 3221218318331021333332982382292333393338333V32241
079 33113282883328232232993839821122229 ft33'8229993343
078 3331218186232813332298981381392333983398339992382
070 8111398198313819222829989189992339383338222992283
Figure 4. Clustered data on 56 non-training/non-midair accidents.
Lines demarcate major clusters and subclusters.
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upper border of the matrix identifying the variables (00 through
48) correspond to those listed in Tables 1 and 2. In studying
a clustered matrix, patterns and interrelationships are more
easily visualized if each level of logic is assigned a color
which is then superimposed on each matrix cell. As a result of
the nature of clustering methodology certain patterns of data
migration occur within the matrix. Accidents and variables having
high information content drift toward the upper left portion of
the matrix, while variables and accidents having relatively low
information content drift toward the lower right of the matrix.
Furthermore, the scaling to which a variable is subjected before
matrix entry (and the resultant frequency of levels of logic
within that variable) assumes importance in terms of the cluster-
ing results. The decisions regarding scaling of the variables
listed in Table 2 were reached based on the experience of the
research team. This matrix can be used as an investigative
model to examine the effects on clusters and patterns of manipu-
lating variables (rescaling, combinations of variables, ratios,
etc.).
The clustered matrix of the 56 accidents in Figure 4 points
out a number of interesting results and commonly shared traits.
The 56 accidents are divided into three distinct clusters on the
basis of airport proximity (the first column, 07). Forty acci-
dents occurred on the airport, nine at less than five miles and
seven over five miles. The cluster of 40 on-airport accidents
is further divided into three subclusters on the basis of "number
of engines" (column or variable 00) - over one half of the on-
airport accidents involved four-engine aircraft. Eighteen acci-
dents are identified as having occurred on the airport, in four-
engine aircraft, in~broken to overcast sky conditions. Of these
latter 18, 11 occurred at night and seven of these were associated
with precipitation. The foregoing is an example of the kinds of
observations possible using this technique. One other interesting
finding in this matrix which is corroborated in Table 2 is that
within this group of 56 accidents, 41 list the captain as having
had over 16 hours of rest prior to that flight. Simple observa-
tion of the "no data" points within the matrix (listed as "9")
quickly demonstrates the magnitude of missing data and areas
requiring standardization of accident data collection. Many hours
have been spent in studying these clusters and many patterns
emerge despite the small number of accidents. This technique is
a useful tool in studying large data sets of aircraft accident
information.
The clustered data on the twelve training accidents is
shown in Figure 5. Although the total number of accidents is
relatively small, a number of commonly shared characteristics
are visible. All 12 accidents were actual training (or profi-
ciency) flights. Of the ten involving four-engine aircraft, six
had a low experienced first officer (0-500 hours in type). All
but one of the 12 occurred on or within five miles of the airport
(column 07). Nine of the 12 occurred during daylight hours
(column 04). Ten occurred in VFR conditions (column 05). The
18
captain was between 40 and 50 years of age in ten of the acci-
dents. These data must be related to the characteristics of
the general population of routine training flights.
CHARACTERISTICS
0111201030221002221001124133224304332143403444343
0483977304206198690821916917737265544236498820319
039 1111112112223229323212929311933922223323939999999
027 11111121122231833233492222334339222332)3333399999
025 1111121291232122222329229339331323333232939999999
073 1111921292932389992822222399999922229829239999999
066 1118233362223361126938232322833942223823232399999
ACCIDENTS 07* 1119911382222299922232229299939989993299939999999
046 1121122482211221322249222322433942293332333399999
021 1131223312232211322142222333433922223332233399999
067 1231113192123212121349233333133923332333333399999
034 1326923191911129111321239139419139992333929999999
077 2312121221122322319221211333223329332333322223199
036 3116212112111319323119129239239929923399939999999
Figure 5..
The clustered data on the seven midair accidents are depicted
in Figure 6. Due to the limited number of accidents the cluster-
ing procedure by itself yields little or no new information.
However, it is evident from the matrix data that six of the acci-
dents occurred in daylight under VFR conditions. All but one had
been in flight under three hours. Six of the seven captains
involved had over 15,000 hours total flight time but three of the
seven had relatively little time in type (0-500 hours). Five of
the seven first officers had low time in type (0-500 hours).
Four of the flights had a 3-man crew; the other three had a 2-man
crew.
CHARACTERISTICS
1221221432002120011423314204330349043431024131004
8207966558061354191630241790713676789349944032262
094 1111111991243422226936139661993229322333323696369
024 11113112293818222169389338893333*9393332339838389
079 1121893116143112228126939889222992699333293696389
ACCIDENTS 029 1213131222213622222232931189223222329333333326389
066 1223213221143622326236919669223332339223332696369
026 2122233112323622332919239489222229292333339296389
036 229213933231U21191931939419332339299333339392339
Figure 6.
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Determinative or Identification Schemes
Another aspect of this clustering methodology is the
ability to determine, when the next event occurs, what the
shortest route would be to identify that event as being similar
to or different from previous events. This requires a method
for constructing identification schemes from accumulated data.
The variables to select in optimally identifying the new event
are those variables which, on the basis of past experience,
separate or partition previous events at the most efficient rate.
The theoretical aspects of this separating or partitioning
of events are discussed in Appendix B and applied to the critical
element data on page 40.
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ACCIDENT CRITICAL ELEMENTS
In the critical element portion of the data collection,
each of the selected accident records was reviewed by the team
members. From these records were extracted critical conditions
and decisions. Critical elements were considered to be those
causal elements, attributes, events or conditions which signifi-
cantly contributed or were related to the occurrence of the
accident. These critical elements were broadly divided into
"critical conditions" and "critical decisions" and consisted of
subjective, qualitative statements whose subject and predicate
were then listed for each accident. The critical elements thus
identified and previously submerged in the records were collected
in a format amenable to meaningful analysis both by themselves
and in combination with the accident variables previously
mentioned. For purposes of matrix entry and analysis, the 19
critical elements were transformed into binary data (element
present or absent, yes or no). The elements were also studied
in subject/predicate form and results and discussion of these
data follow.
Critical Conditions
The critical condition category model is depicted in
Table 3.
Table 4 depicts the type of accident by phase of opera-
tion. Classification and phase of operation are as coded by
the NTSB. Those operations that are concerned with reaching
the runway touchdown point have the highest frequency of occur-
rence in the accident population, i.e. 13 undershoots, nine
hard landings, eight overshoots, and seven ground-loop/swerves.
Forty-seven out of the 74 accidents (64%) occurred during the
landing phase of operation.
Table 5 depicts critical conditions in 56 non-training/
non-midair accidents, seven midair accidents and 12 training
accidents. On the ordinate are listed the ten critical condi-
tions and on the abscissa are listed the code numbers for each
accident in its respective grouping. The parenthetical number
shown with each critical condition (e.g. 38 following "experi-
ence" ) indicates that there were 38 accidents in which experience
was a critical condition within the accident set.
Of the 12 training accidents, one accident was actually an
on-line training event. The 11 others were training or pro-
ficiency type flights. In the training group, there were eight
machine-related accidents, six decision-related accidents and
21
TABLE 3
CRITICAL CONDITION CATEGORIES
1. Experience
a. Low pilot time in type
b. Low copilot time in type
c. Low pilot time in position (as Captain)
d. Low copilot time (total)
e. Other (includes: recent experience, training, flight
engineer, age differences, student pilot new, crew new,
student pilot dull, new airport)
2. Distraction
a. Communications or traffic (excessive communications with
ATC or looking out for traffic)
b. Confusion (last minute approach changes or other confusion)
c. Hurry (close departure on same runway or other hurrying)
d. Holding or delay
e. Other (includes: wake turbulence, numerous distractions,
foreign student, first officer monitoring instruments,
interrupted checklist, fuel burn, paperwork, poor destina-
tion weather, instructor pilot checklist, takeoff position
holding, ashtray fire)
3. Crew Coordination
a. Disagreement (disagreement on approach or configuration, or
other pilot calls "off profile")
b. Jumpseat occupant or other additional crew
c. No required altitude callouts
d. Pilot acting as instructor
e. Other (includes: loose student/instructor relationship or
other interactions such as flaps without student knowing,7
altitude confusion, distrust first officer, thought con-
tinuing takeoff, gear up without visual verification, both
pilots on controls, non-compliance, confusion on who was
flying)
4. Neglect
a. No cross-check on ILS
b. Improper use of checklist
c. Improper rest/procedure
d. Other (includes: company did not revise checklist, other
aircraft collision light off, ATC, Mach trim switch,
engine reversing indicator lights, VOR out, clearance
deviation)
5. Air Traffic Control
a. Delayed landing clearance
b. Confusing radar vector
c. Advised of traffic
d. Poor, weak or malfunctioning radar or radar return
e. Other (includes: no acknowledgement, no advisories, vector
confirmation, advisory holds)
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TABLE 3
CRITICAL CONDITION CATEGORIES (continued)
6. "Decisions"
a. Off acceptable profile
b. Institutional decisions: OK to operate
c. Copilot flying, taken over by pilot
7. Work/Rest (fatigue)
a. On duty over 8 hours
b. Minimum rest
c. Early morning departure
8. Machine ^
a. Gross weight (overweight or heavy gross weight)
b. Simulated engine shutoff (engine failure simulation)
c. System failure .
d. . Other (includes: simulated rudder loss, flight director
oscillation, spoiler deployment and retraction, battery
switch, 3 & 4 engine reverse, slow spool, air noise,
parking brake versus mechanical failure, seat failure)
9. Airport
a. Stopping problem (runway slippery, wet, slush, braking
action poor, or tire residue)
b. Touchdown problem (runway short or displaced threshold)
c. Vertical guidance problem (no approach light, approach
lights out, or localizer only)
d. Runway hazards (upslope threshold, exposed lip or dropoff)
e. Other (includes: runway markings obliterated, uncontrolled
airport, irregular lights, loose pavement, hilly terrain)
10. Weather
a. Visibility problem (heavy rain at threshold, below circling
minimums, fog, snow or haze or other visibility restric-
tions)
b. Thunderstorm influencing airport or enroute weather
c. Wind gusty
d. Other (includes: same route, weather above circling mini-
mums, enroute weather, freezing drizzle, venturi wind)
23
TABLE 4
Type of Accident
No. NTSB Code/Description
7 A Ground Loop/Swerve
1 B Dragged wingtip
1 C Wheels up
2 E Gear collapsed
9 G Hard landing
8 J Overshoot
13 K Undershoot
6 LO Collision with A/C
(both inflight)
4 Ml Collision with ground/
water (uncontrolled)
4 MO Collision with ground/
water (controlled)
4 Nl Collided with trees
1 N6 Collided with runway/
approach lights
2 NB Collided with ditches
1 0 Hail damage
3 Q Stall
1 SO Airframe failure
(inflight)
5 u Engine failure/
malfunction
2 3 Uncontrolled altitude
deviation
Phase of Operation
Taxi Takeoff Inflight Landing
2 2 - 3
1
1
2
9
8
13
2
3
74 12 13 47
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TABLE 5
CRITICAL CONDITIONS
Non-Training/Non-Midair (56)
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
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13
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15
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five experience-related accidents. Excluding the on-line train-
ing accident, the significant observation is that seven of the
11 training flights were operating with simulated engine failures.
In most cases of operating with simulated engine failures, pro-
files of flight were unacceptable (decision information). Flight
parameters were allowed to continue beyond the point where the
instructor could regain control of the aircraft before the acci-
dent. Three out of the five accidents where experience was
involved included an instructor pilot who was new at his job.
Two of the crew coordination items out of the four were inter-
ruption of cockpit routine by a jumpseat occupant or additional
crew member. The one item of neglect was an instance where the
company did not update the emergency checklist. In general the
training accidents involve conditions of relatively good weather
and relatively few airport problems.
Of the seven midair accidents, one was also a training
accident. In this event set of midair accidents, both distrac-
tions and ATC problems predominate. In fact, each accident has
either a distraction or an ATC condition or both. Distractions
included "hurryup" approaches, evaluating runway identifier
lights, an ashtray fire and a radio frequency change. Of the
four ATC conditions, two involved poor or malfunctioning ATC
radar equipment, and two involved situations in which no traffic
advice or warnings were given. If one ATC problem was shifted
to neglect, the seven midair accidents would then be: two acci-
dents where ATC radar was malfunctioning or of inadequate quality;
one where ATC did not advise or warn of traffic; one where the
air carrier aircraft exceeded its clearance limit; and three
where neglect on the part of the aircraft other than the air
carrier aircraft played a vital role in the accident (such as
not reporting position, not using navigation lights, or deviat-
ing from a clearance).
Some general observations may be made about the 56 non-
training/non-midair accidents. The most commonly observed
characteristic among the 56 accidents is experience, which
occurs in 38 accidents. Second in occurrence is airport condi-
tions which appear in 32 accidents. Decisions appeared in 31
accidents, and weather in 28. Further partitioning of the data
is possible. For example, in the experience grouping, there
were 28 accidents with copilot low in time in type. Twenty
accidents occurred with low pilot time in type. Sixteen acci-
dents occurred where both the pilot and copilot had low time in
type. Again, low time in type is described as less than 500
hours in the particular type of airplane involved. Partitioning
the condition of airport, we find 16 accidents where there was
a stopping problem, nine accidents where there was a touchdown
problem and seven accidents where there was a vertical guidance
problem. In the decision classification, the most frequent
characteristic appearing was "off profile", occurring in 21
accidents. The predominant weather condition was visibility,
occurring in 20 accidents.
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In an attempt to more closely study certain subcharacteris-
tics (e.g. subcategories of decisions, such as 6a, off accept-
able profile), a screening technique was applied to the data.
The technique is graphically presented in Figure 7.
Of 21 off profile accidents (first screen):
Seven were experience only related, with one or
both pilots having low time in type;
Four involved changeover of control from the
copilot to pilot (In only one of these cases
was there an experience-related problem; three
of the four had weather problems, and of these
three, two had airport problems);
Four shared a common characteristic of a dis-
agreement of aircraft operation. In three of
these, the pilot in command was also acting as
instructor pilot. Two were also related to
experience, with both pilot and copilot having
low time in type;
Three experience-related accidents had no
attending weather or airport problems, but all
had copilot low time in type;
The remaining three accidents showed airport
problems, with two being touchdown problems
and one a vertical guidance problem.
Of 16 accidents with low copilot time in type (second
screen):
No off profile condition noted;
Nine associated with weather problems (seven
with poor visibility, two with thunderstorms);
Four were machine-related, with such problems
as antiskid device inoperative, stall warn-
ing device inoperative, etc.;
Three shared no common trait other than low
copilot time in type, but all three were
accidents in which information was sparse;
In the total group of 74 accidents, seven had
some type of system malfunction; six of these
occurred in this group.
Of 14 accidents with airport-related problems:
Neither off profile nor low time in type for
copilot were present;
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74 PILOT ERROR RELATED ACCIDENTS
12 TRAINING
(includes 1 midair)
H 7 M I D A I R I(includes 1 training)!
56 NON-TRAINING/NON-MID AIR
C R I T I C A L C O N D I T I O N S C R E E N
21 OFF PROFILE
16 LOW COPILOT TIME IN TYPE
14 AIRPORT RELATED PROBLEMS
5 ATYPICAL
56
35
19
Figure 7.
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Seven had stopping problems;
Four had runway hazards;
Two had touchdown problems;
One had a vertical guidance problem;
Eight contained elements of distraction,
with five accidents having holding or
other delays.
The remaining five accidents (fourth screen) do not have
the above characteristics in common. Further observation of the
data on these accidents, however, reveals other interesting facts.
For example, none were in the approach and landing phase of opera-
tion; all captains had over 6000 hours total flying time, were
well rested, and had not flown in excess of 210 hours in the pre-
ceding 90 days; pilots had had less than six hours flying time in
the preceding 24 hours; and all accidents occurred between 1400
and 2200 hours, local time.
The 56 non-training/non-midair accidents are baffling and
complex in nature. Another technique was devised to study this
group. This method was opposite in nature to previous methods.
Those characteristics found in the largest number dealt with
experience, decisions, airport and weather problems. In reverse,
we withdrew those accidents.which showed none of the most common
traits. Seven such accidents were of this type. The most unique
trait observed within this group of seven was that they contained
the five atypicals described above. In an examination of the
seven accidents it was found that each accident was so unique
that a sibling could not be found in the accident group of 74.
While some of these seven accidents were complex, it could be
observed that if one condition in the enabling factors could be
changed, an accident might not have happened. Due to the sensi-
tive nature of the accident data, specific description of
enabling factors cannot be mentioned. In general the "one of a
kind" atypical accident enabling factor falls into such groups
as design hazards, physical hazards, and system malfunctions.
It may be that there is such a thing as an "irreducible minimum"
of human factors accidents and that these atypical or "freak"
accidents may represent that minimum. Certainly we cannot sub-
scribe to the ludicrous concept that there is an acceptable
tolerance level for human factors accidents, but we do feel that
there indeed may be a small group of accidents that will not be
classifiable as reasonably preventable; and zero human error,
while a superb ideal, remains a Utopian goal.
There were 11 accidents in which only one of the common
traits could be found. This group will be the subject for
further examination. It presently appears to be related to the
previously discussed seven (none of which contained a common
trait) but in less subtle enabling factors.
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The remaining group of 37 accidents possesses two or more
of the common traits. Again, reviewing the common traits:
experience, i.e. low pilot time in type, low copilot time in
type; decisions, i.e. off profile flight conditions; airport,
i.e. stopping problem, touchdown problem, vertical guidance
problem; weather, i.e. visibility problem. It appears to this
group of investigators that methods can be devised to limit or
provide warning in the event that two or more of these enabling
factors are present. If such a system could be devised and
placed in use, it should be the foundation of an effective
accident prevention program.
Critical Decisions
The purpose of this portion of the study was to examine in
detail those pilot decisions that were made in the period just
prior to the accident event. This data set was collected
separately from the critical conditions using a somewhat differ-
ent approach. Consequently, the "decisions" listed in the
critical condition classification are distinct from the decisions
in this section.
Inappropriate decisions preceding a pilot error-related
aircraft accident are often the result of inaccurate perceptions
or of failure to make timely decisions (19). In order to analyze
critical decisions collected on 73 accidents (one of the selected
74 -accidents had no available information from which to abstract
critical decision elements), a listing in the form of one-
sentence descriptors was made for each accident following review
of the record. Inter-investigator variability was checked by
having each record analyzed independently by several analysts.
This cross-check showed no meaningful differences between inves-
tigators.
The working definition of a critical decision adopted for
data collection considered it to be a critical information pro-
cessing function (choice) of a flight crew member occurring in
the time period just prior to the accident event. Identification
of critical decisions was cued to the review of factual accident
records for control inputs, verbal communications, post-accident
flight crew statements, flight profile, etc. When all the
decision data had been collected, Altman's classification scheme
was adapted in order to catalog and classify the data set ( 3).
Table 6 lists the major categories of critical decisions in the
73 accidents.
The critical decisions listed for all the accidents were
then sorted by accident into three major groups: Non-training/
non-midair (55 accidents), training (12 accidents), and midairs
(7 accidents). One training accident was a midair collision;
thus both the training and midair groups share one accident (a
total of 18 accidents).
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TABLE 6
CRITICAL DECISION CATEGORIES
1. Decisions resulting from out-of-tolerance (off profile)
conditions
a. Takeover of controls
b. Verbal instructions between pilots
c. Excessive deviation called out
d. Inadequate braking observed
e. Assistance in flight control operation
f. Attempt to regain directional control
g. Go-around initiated
h. Other*
2. Decisions based on erroneous sensory inputs
a. Approach continued visually
b. Decided profile within limits
c. Misleading cockpit display
d. Misleading navigation information
e. Runway/braking misinformation
f. Final approach/flare profile misinformation
g. Standard operating procedure distraction
h. Other
3. Decisions delayed
a. Takeover of flight controls or assistance
b. Go-around decision
c. Takeoff abort
d. Thrust lever movement
e. Other
4. Decision process biased by necessity to make destination or
press-on (meet schedule)
a. Continued flight with equipment failure
b. Altered cockpit procedures
c. Continue with weather conditions deteriorating
d. Runway misinformation
e. Decision involved approach procedure
f. Other
5. Incorrect weighting of sensory inputs or responses to a
contingency
a. Deviation from checklist/altitude callouts
b. Icing of aircraft
c. Disregard of cockpit displays
d. Traffic information disregarded
e. Disregard information on landing environment or conditions
f. Safety degradation due to training
g. Other
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TABLE 6
CRITICAL DECISION CATEGORIES (continued)
6. Incorrect choice of two alternatives based on available
information
a. Left cockpit
b. Landed runway with unfavorable conditions
c. Flew visual approach
d. Other
7. Correct decision
a. Checked approach light level
b. Confirmed minimums
c. Took over and flew approach
d. Other
8. Overloaded or rushed situation for making decision
a. Primary attention diverted
b. Aircraft power difficulty
c. Observed traffic and rolled aircraft
d. Other
9. Desperation or self-preservation dec.ision
a. Directional control or stopping problem
b. Airborne loss of control
c. Avoid ground contact
d. Avoid other aircraft
e. Other
* Critical decisions listed as "other" in each category were
miscellaneous and too few in number to list herein.
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Non-Training/Non-Midair Accidents. Table 7 summarizes the
critical decisions listed for the 55 non-training/non-midair acci-
dents. (Entries are not mutually exclusive; one accident may have
critical decisions listed under several categories.) Within this
group of 55 accidents, the greatest number of critical decisions,
37, were made as a result of conditions being out of tolerance
with respect to a normal flight profile. A pilot often accepts
an off-profile deviation to accommodate air traffic control con-
straints, airport noise regulations, passenger comfort and other
restrictions. The second highest number of critical decisions,
30, in this group were those that were based on erroneous sensory
inputs. Leak observed this phenomenon in a study of USAF approach
and landing accidents: "Although a number of areas need increased
emphasis, the critical one appears to be information." (11) Willis
and Bryant refer to the false hypothesis concept where the more
limited or the more vague the information, the less time the pilot
has for evaluation (23).
The next group of decisions, 27, involves incorrect weight-
ing of sensory inputs or responses to a contingency. Scucchi
and Sells refer to this hazard of inaccurate information process-
ing as one that flight training and flight operations must come
to recognize (19). Those decisions which are biased by pressure
to make the destination or to meet the schedule account for the
next highest number of critical decisions, 26. This kind of
decision may be a result of conditioning pilots receive every
day of continuing the planned flight profile. There seems to be
a "continue on and it will work out" attitude in accidents involv-
ing this type of decision.
Training Accidents. Table 8 summarizes the critical
decisions made in 12 training type aircraft accidents. The two
most common critical decision categories in this group are those
decisions delayed beyond the time required and those made as a
result of conditions out of tolerance, eight. "Delaying decisions"
is inherent in pilot training procedures employed by flight in-
structors. The tendency is to allow the student as much time as
possible to recognize and correct a dangerous situation before
taking over.
Midair Collision Accidents. In the midair collision acci-
dents the most frequent decision listed is that based on the
requirement to continue to the destination or make schedule,
five. Decisions based upon incorrect weighting of inputs numbered
three. An example of this kind of decision is one where the
pilot is issued air traffic information while other cockpit
duties require' his primary concentration. Table 9 summarizes
the decisions made in the seven midair collisions.
Combinations of Critical Decisions. The (critical decision
data were also studied in terms of the combinations of decisions
appearing within a given accident. Table 10 lists the frequency
of more common combinations of two and three decisions found
within the 55 non-training/non-midair accidents. Whenever
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF CRITICAL DECISIONS
IN 55 NON-TRAINING/NON-MIDAIR ACCIDENTS
TYPE OF DECISION NO. OF DECISIONS
1. Conditions out of tolerance 37
2. Erroneous inputs 30
5. Incorrect weighting of inputs 27
4. Make destination/Press-on 26
3. Delayed 20
9. Desperation 10
8. Overloaded or rushed 9
7. Correct decision 8
6. Incorrect cnoice 5
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TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF CRITICAL DECISIONS
IN 12 TRAINING ACCIDENTS
TYPE OF DECISION NO. OF DECISIONS
3. Delayed 8
1. Conditions out of tolerance 8
5. Incorrect weighting of inputs 7
2. Erroneous inputs 3
9. Desperation 3
8. Overloaded or rushed 2
4. Make destination or Press-on 1
6. Incorrect choice 2
7. Correct decision
35
TABLE 9
SUMMARY OF CRITICAL DECISIONS
IN 7 MIDAIR COLLISIONS
TYPE OF DECISION NO. OF DECISIONS
4. Make destination or press-on 5
5. Incorrect weighting of inputs 3
1. Conditions out of tolerance 2
2. Erroneous inputs / 2
9. Desperation 2
8. Overloaded or rushed 1
3. Delayed
6. Incorrect choice
7. Correct decision
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TABLE 10
COMBINATIONS OF CRITICAL DECISIONS
IN NON-TRAINING/MIDAIB ACCIDENTS (55)
COMBINATION OF 2 DECISION CATEGORIES NO. OF ACCIDENTS
Conditions out of tolerance
and Erroneous inputs 18
Conditions out of tolerance
and Make destination or press-on 17
Conditions out of tolerance
and Incorrect weighting of inputs 16
Conditions out of tolerance
and Delayed ' 16
Erroneous inputs /
and Make destination or press-on 13
Erroneous inputs /
and Incorrect weighting of inputs 13
Delayed
and Incorrect weighting of inputs 11
Make destination
and Incorrect weighting of inputs 11
COMBINATION OF 3 DECISION CATEGORIES
I
Conditions out of tolerance, /
Delayed
and Incorrect weighting of inputs 10
Conditions out of tolerance,
Erroneous inputs
and Make destination or press-on , 8
Conditions out of tolerance,
Erroneous inputs|
and Delayed
Conditions out of tolerance,
Erroneous inputs
and Incorrect weighting of inputs
Conditions out of tolerance,
Delayed
and Make destination or press-on
Conditions out of tolerance,
Make destination or press-on
and Incorrect weighting of inputs
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sequential decisions of the categories listed in this table were
made, they often resulted in inaccurate information processing.
There appears to be a need for further research into more effic-
ient means for a pilot to make decisions involving conditions
out of tolerance, incorrect weighting of inputs, erroneous
sensory inputs and combinations thereof.
Associations of Critical Decisions with Critical Conditions
The following chart lists the number and type of critical
decisions found to appear concurrently within an accident, with
specific critical conditions:
1. Condition: Off acceptable profile (21 accidents)
Associated Decisions No. of Decisions
1. Resulting from "out of tolerance" 23
2. Erroneous inputs 12
4. Make destination/press-on 12
5. Incorrect weighting of inputs 12
3. Delayed 9
7. Correct decision 3
8. Overloaded 1
9. Desperation . 1
6. Incorrect
2. Condition: Low copilot time in type (16 accidents)
Associated Decisions No. of Decisions
1. Resulting from "out of tolerance" * 11
4. Make destination/press-on 10
2. Erroneous inputs 9
3. Delayed 6
5. Incorrect weighting of inputs 5
9. Desperation 5
6. Incorrect 3
8. Overloaded 2
7. Correct decision 1
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3. Condition: Airport (14 accidents)
Associated Decisions Tflo. of Decisions
5. Incorrect weighting of inputs 11
1. Resulting from "out of tolerance" 10
2. Erroneous inputs 7
3. Delayed 6
4. Make destination/press-on 5
7. Correct decision 4
8. Overloaded 3
6. Incorrect 1
9. Desperation
It should be noted that with each of the three critical
conditions listed above, the five most frequently associated
critical decisions were (1) decision regarding conditions out of
tolerance, (2) decisions from erroneous inputs, (3) delayed
decisions, (4) make destination/press-on based decisions, and
(5) decisions based on incorrect weighting of inputs. "Airport
problem" accidents most often involve erroneous decisions due to
incorrect weighting of sensory inputs. Accidents associated with
low copilot time in type and off-profile are often associated
with decisions regarding conditions out of tolerance.
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CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ELEMENTS
The clustering method using truth table classification
(Appendix A) was applied to the critical conditions and decisions
data available for the 56 non-training/non-midair accidents. The
input data matrix consisted of 19 critical elements (in binary
form, "present" or "not listed") on 56 accidents. Results of the
clustering procedure are depicted in Figure 8. One can see in
the matrix how this agglomerative type of clustering links, by
the state of a variable (in this case a given critical element
present or not listed), the 56 accidents and creates progressively
smaller subclusters. Also evident are groups of accidents sharing
multiple critical element states.
Using this clustered matrix of critical elements the deter-
minative or identification scheme (Appendix B) was applied. The
partitioning or separation ability of each critical element was
calculated and these are listed in Table 11. Critical element 10
separates 784 of the 1540 pairs. Critical elements 10 and 15
separate 1175 of the 1540 pairs. The first nine elements listed
in the Table separate 1538 (99.9%) of the 1540 possible pairs of
accidents these then are the "nine best tests" that, applied
in sequence, will provide optimal separation of events. This
information is graphically presented in Figure 9 and compares
the resultant curve of separation with the theoretical curve (in
which the nine best tests would separate 100% of the pairs).
These selected nine critical elements were then used to
construct a matrix of the 56 accidents and the data were clus-
tered using truth table classification. Figure 10 shows the
clustered results and demonstrates how the nine critical elements,
when applied in sequence listed, progressively partition the
56 events optimally. For example, the critical element "weather"
(number 10) partitions the events into two clusters of equal
size. The next element, "decisions based on incorrect weighting
of sensory inputs" (number 15), partitions each cluster created
by element 10 into nearly equal subclusters (independent of
element 10). This partitioning is continued by the other crit-
ical elements in sequence. An inference that can be made from
the foregoing is that on the basis of this data set (past
experience), a future accident could be examined most efficiently
by studying the critical elements in the sequence shown, and
that the nine elements listed will most economically and quickly
provide information on a new given non-training/non-midair acci-
dent. It should be noted that the methodology described earlier
for calculating likelihood for patterns of states of variables
is also applicable to this data particularly when information
regarding frequency of patterns that have occurred is available.
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Critical Elements:
Conditions:
01. Experience
02. Distraction
03. Crew Coordination
04. Neglect
05. Air Traffic Control
06. "Decisions"
07. Work/Rest
08. Machine
09. Airport
10. Weather
Decisions based on:
11. "Out of tolerance" conditions
12. Erroneous sensory inputs
13. Delayed decisions
14. Make destination/press-on
15. Incorrect weighting
16. "Incorrect choice"
17. Correct decisions
18. Overloaded or rushed situation
19. Desperation (self-preservation
decisions)
Figure 8. Clustered critical elements* on 56 non-training/
non-midair accidents.
*1 = Present, 2 = Not listed.
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Figure 10. Reclustered critical elements on 56 non-training/
non-midair accidents.
*Refer Figure 8 for listing of the 19 elements.
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The many different kinds of clustering methodology in
themselves are barren. The crux of the matter is interpretation
of results after clustering and, hopefully, that the clusters
generated in the data set are well differentiated and will pro-
vide corroborative evidence of being sensitive and stable. Each
person is his own clusterer or classifier; there is no general
theory of clustering or classifying anything. In parallel,
there are many different kinds of clustering methodology and the
open-minded investigator should entertain many alternative ways
of handling his data set. In the discussion above, no so-called
truth is ascribed to rearrangements of numbers automatically
done by machines. A lower level of abstraction with more meaning
is required - the statements of characteristics describing events
are symbolized with numbers and are used in creating a compound
definition of events. These are presented in combination with
descriptions of other events thus allowing for new inferences
and possible discovery. No fountainhead of truth in itself is
implied, merely a form of descriptive statistics and the basis
for inference.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A multidisciplinary human factors systems analysis has
been conducted on all those NTSB records of U.S. air carrier
jet accidents with human factors cause elements identified which
were complete enough for exhaustive analysis. The time period
covered was from 1958 through 1970. The human factor classifi-
cation of the 74 accidents as assigned by the NTSB was accepted
without question by the study investigators, but we have no
quarrel with the classification of these accidents after ex-
haustive study of the records.
The analytic techniques applied here are new to accident
analysis and provide a systematic evaluation of human factors
data of such complexity as to be normally resistant to analysis
by even sophisticated techniques (10). The critical decision
and critical condition data are new and were not heretofore
available or highlighted. The models for critical decisions
and critical conditions are workable and offer promise for
future accident evaluation. They have been most useful in
identifying out of a morass of data those elements deserving
further study and/or research.
The NTSB computer data alone would not provide information
on whether a given accident or set of accidents was human error-
related, if that descriptor were not a part of the computer file
for that accident. That is, the computer data have no selective
qualities of identifiability from the viewpoint of critical
elements we have outlined. This area is therefore deserving
of further development. One could speculate that the relative
barrenness of the data collection in the human elements of the
computer filed information may have been due to a lack of
satisfactory means of reducing the information to the computer
language. In that case, the model presented here may help.
Further, the model may add objectivity to the collection and
interpretation of subjective information bits. The paucity of
data could also be at least partly accounted for because of the
lack of emphasis on such data collection or the absence of
appropriate regard for the value of such data. Appropriate
emphasis for all elements of data is imperative, with weightings
due to individual bias on the part of the accident investigators
precluded by the very nature of the investigative scheme.
Human error versus non-human error partitioning may be
felt to be a fundamental mistake in classification and it may
be that a man-machine-environment or host-agent-environment
scheme may be more fruitful, especially in longitudinal analyses.
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However, "human error" as a classification, regardless of its
shortcomings, has the overwhelming advantage of centering
attention on the group of accidents (with at least one major
common element) to which a significant amount of attention
should be devoted, and to the group where a high likelihood
of success exists. We have experienced no serious difficulty
in applying the analytic techniques described earlier, which
include the epidemiologic host-agent-environment scheme, as
an overlay to the already categorized human error accident set.
Inherent in the many difficulties faced by investigators
and analysts who must attempt to make meaning out of collected
bits of information is the changing quality of the contingencies
affecting the accumulation of happenings and the gathering of
data relating to these events. Observer variations, variations
in the quality and quantity of data collected, variations in
the techniques and efficiency of the coders of the data, are
only a few of the problems. The nature of these problems is
so complex that it would require a separate treatise to deal
with this subject alone. In fact, many would point out that
these very problems introduce such variability into the data
that it is impossible to analyze and gather from the analysis
any meaningful results or conclusions.
Jacobs (10), in a paper devoted to a discussion of some
of the conceptual and methodological problems in accident
research, deals particularly with problems encountered in
formal statistical inference, when use is made of traditional
techniques. He feels that the existence of the pitfalls and
difficulties have contributed largely to the lack of research
achievement in the field despite many years of effort. Pointing
out that analysis of data on a large number of accidents in
aggregate has rarely produced any practicable remedy which
would'have prevented any substantial number of accidents, he
attributes the problems of analysis to the fact that in any
single accident there are a number of combined coincidental
events and circumstances of a causal nature, in the absence
of any one of which, there would not have been an accident,
and that the production of the accident required the combination.
To answer why analytical and correlational studies have seldom
led to the development and application of useful countermeasures,
he offers two explanations. First, he points out that this type
of research presents very difficult methodological and conceptual
problems, most of which are not commonly perceived, and, secondly,
he states that the treatment of these methodological problems
requires a magnitude of effort which goes far beyond that which
is generally required for productive research in most other
fields of inquiry. However, the data on accidents collected
by the NTSB is virtually all of the information we have, and
a system of interpreting such data, with all the inherent defects
of the data admitted, is badly needed. The techniques used here
provide, we feel, a method of dealing with an overwhelming mass
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of data, and a method of comparing apples and oranges without
forcing the investigator into the hopeless corner of bit-by-bit
analysis with which the human mind cannot cope.
Another major problem which has plagued the entire field
of accident investigation is that provided by the semantic
restraints inherent in the definition of the term accident itself.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language(22) defines accident as follows (irrelevant comments
are excluded for purposes of brevity):
accident n. (fr Latin root aoaidens meaning nonessential
quality or circumstance, accident, chance, from present
participle of aacidere to happen). la: an event or
condition occurring by chance or arising from unknown
or remote causes, b: lack of intention or necessity:
CHANCE - often opposed to design, c: an unforeseen un-
planned event or condition. 2a: a usually sudden event
or change occurring without intent or volition through
carelessness, unawareness, ignorance, or a combination
of causes and producing an unfortunate result, b: an
unexpected medical development especially of an un-
fortunate or injurious nature occurring in apparently
good health or during the course of a disease or a
treatment, c: an unexpected happening causing loss or
injury which is not due to any fault or misconduct on
the part of the person injured but from the consequences
of which he may be entitled to some legal relief.
3: an adventitious characteristic that is either in-
separable from the individual and the species or separable
from the individual but not the species; 'broadly: any
fortuitous or nonessential property, fact or circumstance.
4: an irregularity of a surface (as of the moon).
Syn: chance, quality. Syn for accidental; fortuitous,
adventitious, contingent, casual, incidental.
Note the synonyms for the words accident and accidental.
The definition of the word causes semantic responses which
are not fruitful - that is, the definition is inherently
negative, both from the viewpoint of the victim and from the
viewpoint o'f the person involved in dealing with the accident
externally, such as the investigator trying to take a con-
structive approach. Social acceptance of the phenomenon leads
to apathy and a feeling of helplessness and futility in trying
to deal with accidents. Since they are fortuitous, there is
nothing we can really do about them anyway, so why try?
Suchman (20) points out that the term "accident" implies un-
expectedness, undesirability, with the implication that un-
anticipated turns of events cannot be prevented and that there
is little to do but clean up the damage. He further elaborates
on the climate of helplessness and despair and attributes this
climate to contributing heavily toward keeping this area of
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human activity out of the realm of scientific investigation.
He then goes on to point out that most accidents do not appear
to be solely chance events, but compose a set of events which
can be identified, classified and analyzed in terms of ante-
cedent and associated events with an eventual goal being
explanation of causation.
Gibson, in discussing the contribution of experimental
psychology to the formulation of the problem of safety (8 ),
refers to the term accident as a makeshift concept with a
hodgepodge of legal, medical and statistical overtones. He
states: "Two of its meanings are incompatible. Defined as
a harmful encounter with the environment, a danger not averted,
an accident is a psychological phenomenon, subject to prediction
and control. But defined as an unpredictable event, it is by
definition uncontrollable. The two meanings are hopelessly
entangled in the common usage, there is no hope of defining
it for research purposes. Hence, I suggest that the word be
discarded in scientific discussion. The problem of accident
prevention should be renamed - perhaps calling it the problem
of safety. It is then, on the one hand, a matter of the
ecology of dangers and the natural or artificial signs of
danger, and, on the other hand, a matter of the psychology
of their perceptions and reactions aroused by these signs.
When thus reformulated, the problem appears in a quite different
light." We wholeheartedly agree with this statement, and
would add only that together with the discarding of the concept
of accident as traditionally defined,should also go, once and
for all, the concept of 'accident proneness1 as a totally worth-
less and unscientific concept. Suchman (20) points out that
there are good reasons for disregarding this model on theoretical,
methodological and mathematical grounds. He states that he does
not believe that the complexity of accidents can be adequately
explained by the simplistic model of a single personality type
which seeks out accidents through some neurotic motivation.
Arbous and McFarland ( 4,13) also find the approach quite in-
adequate.
We have not allowed ourselves to be drawn into the problem
of defining an accident. The operational concept of this
research project has been to deal with each "accident" as a
successful event and we have found the concept useful in helping
to establish a positive frame of mind, if nothing else. Viewing
accidents as successful events, we have been able to review
identifiable factors pertaining to the accident in terms of what
we chose to call "accident enabling factors", or factors without
which the accident could not occur. Not all factors (conditions
and decisions) fit the definition of accident enabling factor,
of course. Another pitfall we tried to avoid in the data
collection phase was thinking of the events associated with an
accident as being right or wrong, good or bad. They were simply
viewed as events without judgment being attached. This is not
to say that judgments are not possible or should not be made,
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but they were not the proper subject of the data gathering
portion of the study.
Accepting conditions out of tolerance (critical decision)
and operating the aircraft in a condition off acceptable or
optimal profile(critical condition), while not identical in
their definition, as can be seen above, are prominent in both
the condition and decision analyses. Accepting conditions
out of tolerance and operating off-profile are inherent in
everyday airline operations. The training effect of operating
outside of what is taught as "proper" airmanship may have a
negative long-term value in flight safety. We feel that there
is a need for intensive study into the relationships that exist
between pilots, airlines and regulatory bodies, with special
attention to defining and understanding how institutional
decisions which involve all of these groups interact to affect
flight safety. As an example of an institutional decision,
we refer to an operational decision to continue a flight with
one generator out of service.
An over-all observation from the decision data leads us
to recommend further research into•the decision-making role
of the pilot. The present cockpit environment has been shown
to be less than ideal for a pilot to be a reliable decision
maker. There are many proposals in the literature for either
adding a pilot decision-maker (19,23) or restructuring the present
pilot functions to include adaptive, computer-assisted decision
making ( 7 ). Resistance to change of the present cockpit work
situation must be met by factual data which point to past
deficiencies in pilot information processing. Task off-loading
and actual training of pilots in decision-making techniques
(particularly with regard to "critical elements") seem to us
to be the most fruitful approaches. We are not prepared at
this time to make recommendations pertaining to the introduction
of specific new equipment into the cockpit to automate some
pilot functions. The reason for this is two-fold; first, we
have not satisfied our own requirements with regard to the depth
of analysis needed in this area, but may have recommendations
later. Secondly, others have pointed out that addition of new
equipment may not necessarily simplify cockpit duties. Addi-
tionally, the cockpit routines which are changed by introduction
of new equipment may complicate the pilot's job and require
changes in learning patterns and instruction which would have
to be analyzed for over-all impact on the man-machine-environment-
contingency model. Obviously, this process should be carried
out in relation to each specific piece of equipment, and is not
the subject of this study. Improving our knowledge of the pilot
as a decision maker could be enhanced by developing human factors
criteria for over-all flight crew-airplane system performance;
by improving feedback loops from on-the-job decision making to
training requirements; by determining the amount and type of
decision information a pilot needs for computer-assisted informa-
tion processing and developing the criteria for the display
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system; and attempting to determine control input task un-
loading during critical flight regimes, with the captain
becoming a decision initiator and inhibitor who provides
occasional start and override commands.
Various elements of the training environment of the
pilot could well be enhanced by knowledge of the information
uncovered here. For example, in the 56 non-training/non-midair
accidents, decisions most often involved conditions out of
tolerance followed by erroneous input information, incorrect
weighting of inputs and requirements to make the destination
or schedule. Training accidents most often involved decision
delayed beyond the time required. Midair collisions most
often involved decisions based on requirements to make the
destination airport or meet the schedule. This information
points to the recommendation that airline training and
operational procedures must be updated to improve the re-
liability of the pilot as an information processor.
Some specific recommendations are made with regard to
recognizing needs in accident investigation. First, there
is a need for better information collection at the accident
site. This information collection must be systematic and
subject to verification. It also requires the insured
cooperation on the part of all persons conducting the in-
vestigation. This naturally implies that the Investigator-
in-Charge must be attuned to the human factors potential for
each accident and must insure that data collection is not
impeded. Human factors investigation personnel are too often
concerned with required hospital investigations, visits to
mortuaries and other relatively routine matters while human
factors information is being collected by operations and ATC
groups. We do not hold that operations and ATC investigators
are not competent to collect human factors information, but
we do believe that the human factors investigator must be
constantly apprised of developments. Not only must the
Investigator-in-Charge be highly sensitive to the needs in
the human factors area and insure proper collection of data,
but the Accident Inquiry Manager must also have the same
orientation. Secondly, there is need for more information
to reconstruct what transpired in the cockpit prior to the
crash. The marked gaps in accident data are not only gaps in
technical information, as seen by perusal of the matrix, but
also significantly large gaps in human error material. The
cockpit voice recorder was available in only seven of the
74 accidents studied here. The cockpit voice recorder is
the best single source of information on the accident and
provides an objective means of judging the cockpit activities
prior to the crash. We are aware that there are many reasons
why the accident data are missing, but are also aware that a
better collecting system would fill in many of the gaps in
the future and would result in the collection of more pertinent
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human error material. Cockpit voice recorders are still being
damaged, especially in those crashes where serious fires occur.
Further research is needed to insure indestructible cockpit
voice recorders. Thirdly, there is a need for a system to let
all individuals directly involved in an accident give an
unimpeded and straightforward story of what transpired. There
is such an overriding consideration of legal liability and
vested interests that pressures on all persons directly involved
often result in a self-preservation decision which diminishes
the reliability of information. As long as legal liability is
determined from a single investigation, this problem will
continue to present itself. We recommend that consideration
be given to congressional legislation which would allow parallel
investigations with regard to cause and legal liability. We
submit that, in the long run, cause is more important than
liability. Fourthly, there is a need for developing a system
to allow quick determination of the likelihood that an accident
has prominent human factors problems, so that such problems
may be recognized and investigated in depth, with the least
amount of time spent on other unproductive activities.
The computer-stored information on the human error
accidents contains objective, measurable characteristics such
as runway length, ceiling, visibility, and pilot time. To
this computer information must be added subjective, sensitive
descriptions of the flight environment. When we were confronted
with the size and bulk of accident information data, the
technique devised to overcome this obstacle was for a trained
researcher to read the accident report and describe those
characteristics which became accident-enabling features. Most
of the information derived with this technique were not available
in computer-stored information. A good example of this was
heavy rain at threshold. Such qualitative data may be recorded
in the report, but for computer-stored information, no indication
of concentration of rain was given. Neither was the position
of the rainshower in relationship to the airport or the runway
environment. Another characteristic observed with this- technique
was off-profile flying that was either high or low, fast or
slow, or offset. Again, this information was reported, but no
capability existed in computer storage of this information.
Few groups or individuals charged with accident analysis
or investigation have been able to overcome the tendency to
put greatest emphasis on the accidents associated with death
and/or destruction. It is understandable that public attention
is focused on the tragic accident, but we cannot agree that only
those accidents or incidents deserve such attention. We were
only able to use 74 of the over 200 accidents having human error
associations because of the paucity of data in the non-tragic
cases. The study of accidents involving human error should be
justifiable on the grounds of the value of the information
gained, and should not be tied to tragic outcome. Just as
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important is the collection and study of data related to
near misses, and we feel a wealth of information is available
here. This would be especially so if anonymity were guaranteed
and comprehensive systematic investigations were carried out
after design of experimental techniques and hypotheses to be
tested (17). All parties to a near miss are available, unlike
many accidents, and the information could prove invaluable.
Although not specifically shown in the presentation of
matrices selected for this paper, we have noted a tendency for
aircraft accidents to occur early in duty periods. Also
associated was the observation that a number of crews involved
in accidents had returned to duty after 16 or more hours off
duty and that there is a paucity of accidents noted at the
home domicile of the crews. It has been suggested that there
may be some relationship to the "warmup" phenomenon seen in
industrial accident studies. Further elucidation of this
subject is indicated, but in order to firmly establish whether
the data are meaningful, it will be necessary to determine
what leg in the duty period the crew was in at the time of
the accident, the number of landings, etc., in order to
determine, among other things, the relative risk of accident
at the home domicile.
Practical application of the concepts developed in this
paper is desirable. This could take several forms:
1. Testing of the conditions-decisions models for
prediction capability,
2. Use of the concepts to develop an expanded human
factors accident investigation format,
3. Use of the models for further data evaluation.
This could require data expansion and, of course, inherent
in the use of the technique is ongoing refinement and
improvement as an inescapable function of use,
4. Use of the models in simulator application.
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CONCLUSIONS
A multidisciplinary team approach to pilot error-related
aircraft accident investigation records has successfully re-
claimed hidden human error information not currently shown in
statistical studies of accidents. New analytic techniques have
been developed and applied to the data in efforts to discover
and identify multiple elements of commonality and shared char-
acteristics within this group of accidents.
Three techniques of analysis were employed: (1) cluster
analysis and pattern recognition, (2) critical conditions, and
(3) critical decisions.
A cluster analysis technique has been modified and applied
to the data. This method is an effective exploratory research
tool that will lead to increased understanding and improved
organization of known facts, the discovery of new meaning in
large data sets, and the generation of explanatory hypotheses.
The technique also provides a simple automated straight-forward
means for visually presenting an otherwise unmanageably large set
of data in its entirety in matrix form, for organizing the data,
clustering the accidents and disclosing and summarizing the
structure of the matrix with a minimum loss of information.
Initial results of the critical element analysis portion
of the study have demonstrated the importance of a subjective
qualitative approach to raw accident data which has surfaced
information heretofore unavailable in succinct detailed summary
in records. Using this approach to extract and analyze those
causal elements, attributes, events and conditions which signi-
ficantly contributed or were related to the occurrence of the
selected accidents, a model was developed. This model, consist-
ing of critical.conditions and critical decisions, was then
applied to the training, midair, and non-training/non-midair
groups of accidents. Other methods of analysis included the
use of a "critical condition screen".
Findings, conclusions and recommendations resulting from
this study include:
1. The cluster analysis technique presents a feasible
method for establishing meaningful concepts and interrelation-
ships out of a large mass of data otherwise impossible to
mentally handle.
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2. Critical element analysis supplements and adds
perspective to accident data and provides vital insight into
real-life operational human factors data in a format amenable
to meaningful analysis.
3. An aircraft accident, in our view, is a positive,
eminently successful event that is inevitable when preceded by
a series of one or more "accident-enabling factors" or conditions
which have to be present and without which the accident cannot
occur. This approach de-emphasizes pilot "fault" and focuses on
the actions and decisions (both proper and improper) that are
carried out as well as those factors that prompt these actions
and decisions.
4. Human factors data as currently collected are inadequate
in defining the "why" of pilot error and the terminology and
classification gives no insight into corrective measures.
5. A number of areas have been identified that require
more research. These include such items as crew interrelation-
ships (coordination, interaction), decision making, approach
monitoring, aircrew fatigue (work/rest schedules), and subtle
operational indices of crew stress and performance decrement.
Current airline pilot training does not seem to adequately prepare
the pilot for the situations encountered in the critical elements
identified in this study. Furthermore, details of cockpit
activity and events are not known in sufficient detail; cockpit
voice recorder data do not provide needed information.
6. There is a need for intensive study into the relation-
ships that exist between pilot, airlines and regulatory bodies,
with special attention to defining and understanding how insti-
tutional decisions which involve all of these groups interact to
affect flight safety.
7. Airline training and operational procedures must be
updated to improve the reliability of the pilot as an information
processer.
8. There is need for improvement in accident investigation,
to include:
a) More systematic collection of human factors data at the
accident site.
b) More information to reconstruct what transpired in the
cockpit prior to the accident.
c) Improved reliability of information by reassessing
pertinent rules and principles of legal liability.
d) Development of an on-site system to allow quick deter-
mination of the likelihood that a given accident has prominent
human factors aspects. This could lead to a more intensive
investigation of human factors features on site, when the
information is still fresh.
9. More attention should be focused on the human error
aspects of near-accidents and incidents.
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APPENDIX A
CLUSTER ANALYSIS AND PATTERN RECOGNITION -
BASIC METHODOLOGY
Nature of the Data Set
The data set consists of information collected on aircraft
accidents over a period of 12 years. Real data sets of this
type present unique problems of analysis. Development of statis-
tical theory generally assumes the use of continuous variables on
an interval scale. The data set we considered, however, consists
of mixed variable types. For this reason, and the desirability
of scale conversion of variables, brief mention will be made of
variables and scales.
Usually in mathematics, variables are classified as being
binary (dichotomous), discrete, and continuous. Examples of
these types of variables in this data set are:
1. Binary variables:
a. Runway lighting on off
b. Precipitation yes no
c. Condition of light day night
2. Discrete variables:
a. Number of engines two three four
3. Continuous variables:
a. Pilot age
b. Temperature
Variables, in addition, may be classified on the basis of their
measurement scale as nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio.
Examples in this data set include:
1. Nominal (xa = x^ or xa ^ x. ) :
a. Precipitation
2. Interval (if xa> x. , a is x& - x^ units or greater
than b):
a. Temperature
In turn, variables classified by range (binary, discrete, contin-
uous) and by scale (nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio) may
be cross-classified. For example, Pilot 1 may be older than
Pilot 2 or Age Pilot I/Age Pilot 2 means Pilot 1 is so many times
56
older than Pilot 2, or Age Pilot 1 - Age Pilot 2 means Pilot 1 is
so many years older than Pilot 2. By scale classification the
variable Age is a ratio variable and by range classification the
variable Age is a continuous variable.
The pilot is continuously confronted with mixed variable
types, including interval, ordinal, binary, and other types.
Statistically, as stated previously, an assumption is made
usually that variables are continuous and on an interval scale
of measurement. Many of the variables in this data set fulfill
this requirement; other variables as illustrated do not. In an
attempt initially not to weight the variables in the data set
as to their relative importance as possible direct or indirect
causative factors in pilot error-related events, and not to
exclude variables arbitrarily from the data set as being unim-
portant, variables were scale-converted to what may be called
polychotomous variables. For example, airport elevation at which
accidents have occurred, or the total range of airport elevation
in the U.S., might be sea level (O1) to 7200". This continuous
variable may be divided into intervals of sea level to 100',
101' to 2000', and over 2000'. Each interval of the variable
may be given a "state" or value of logic designation. That is,
0-100' designated by 1, 101-2000' designated 2, and greater than
2000' by 3. One or more variables within the same data set may
be scaled into different numbers of states which are given a
"value or state of logic." This permits the construction of
"truth tables", which consider every possible combination of
logic states. For example, if all variables were scaled to
binary (dichotomous) values (two states or values of logic) and
there were 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., of these variables, the total
possible number of binary sequences of yes and no (1 and 0)
would be respectively 21=2, 22=4, 23=8, 24=16, etc. (See Table
12.) An important observation is that the truth tables of the
higher valued states always contain the sequences of the lower
valued states, i.e. , truth table C is contained in truth table E
(Table 12).
This methodology then permits the analysis of mixed vari-
able types in the same matrix, closely approximating the real
world data set. After the variables have been scaled, the data
are analyzed by clustering, by truth table analysis to determine
the frequency of patterns of variables. This enables one to
establish the likelihood of occurrence of patterns as states of
variables that contribute to pilot error-related events. Lastly,
the method permits the selection of decision variables to be
applied in studying the next event to determine if it fits pre-
vious variable patterns. The methods used are forms of matrix
or concept learning which are correctable as more information
becomes available with time. Statistical stability of clusters
detects states of variables which may be correctable states for
improving flight safety.
By use of automated data processing procedures it is
possible to handle large data sets. For purposes of illustration,
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TABLE 12
Examples of 2-state (A - D) and 3-state (E) conversion of
variables and the possible sequences. These are truth tables
and are Boolean expansions of Aristotelean truth tables.
Truth Table: A B C D E
li l£ _2_1 24 33
1 11 111 1111 222
0 10 110 1110 221
01 101 1101 220
00 100 1100 212
Oil 1011 211
010 1010 210
001 1001 202
000 1000 201
0111 200
0110 122
0101 121
0100 120
0011 112
0010 111
0001 110
0000 102
101
100
022
021
020
012
Oil
010
002
001
000
*Arrows indicate where truth table C sequences are contained
within truth table E.
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to show how the methodology described can be used to draw con-
clusions concerning contingency relationships in accidents, a
small and generalized example will be given using a total of 27
accidents and four variables scaled to 3-valued logic. The
nature of the data set is such that data are collected as they
become available in time, with the occurrence of each event.
Data on selected variables are systematically collected as well
as data for any other variable which appears applicable. The
data are presented in the format of a matrix of events-versus-
variables with the state of the variable indicated at the proper
cell in the matrix.
Initially, data may be recorded sequentially for 13 events
over four variables scaled into 3-valued logic (2, 1, 0), with
"2" assigned the highest value of logic (see Table 13). For
each variable, over all events, the numbers (N) of each state of
logic are enumerated (N2, N^, NQ) (Matrix A, Table 13). The
columns (variables) are then rearranged in descending order of
the highest level of logic (leftmost column has greatest total
of "2's")(Matrix B, Table 13). Each row pattern in Matrix B
is traced on the truth table in Table 14 (solid black square = 2,
open square with dot = 1, open square = 0) and the rows of
Matrix B are rearranged vertically in their order of occurrence
in Table 14. Three large clusters of five, three and five events
(outlined with lines) are formed, each having subclusters
(Matrix C, Table 13).
The reason for applying this clustering methodology is that
all clusters and subclusters are logically disjoint. This means
that when the next event occurs the pattern of states of the
variables may be identified uniquely as belonging to a particular
cluster and the same as some event in the cluster. Classification
(synonomous here with the formed clusters) and identification are
considered inverse mental activities. Clustering or classifying
and the clusters and classes so formed are considered a matter
of induction because we do not have every possible event and we
infer that the classes or clusters are stable and significant.
Inversely, identification is considered a matter of deduction.
If the next event is not identifiable, however, the values for
the variables are added to the matrix and the resulting updated
matrix reclustered. This process is shown in Table 13, Matrices
D, E, and F. Clusters in Matrices C and F may be summarized.
This is sometimes preferable, especially when the number of
events becomes very large. These clusters are formed by "relat-
edness" of states of variables and provide insight for discover-
ing possible new heretofore unsuspected relationships within
these events (accidents). An advantage of using clustering is
that known data are all considered within one matrix. These
clusters demonstrate a structure in the data set and the rela-
tionships of patterns of variables to events, with a minimum
loss of information. This would not be possible if the data were
abstracted further. In addition, as data are accumulated, it is
possible to determine the sensitivity and statistical stability
of the clusters. This forms a basis for the study of relation-
ships of variables and factors within the events. These are
learning matrices, as described by Rypka (18).
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TABLE 14 *
CHAR-
ACTERS
LLl
LU
r-T
oo
cc.
o
co111
ae.
LL.
o
CO
cc
ui
GENERAL EQUATION
S = [ 1 - Vk ] /[ 1 - Vc ] CO
o:
a
u.
o
C£
a.
LJ
co
l-
z
LLl
O
Of.
LJ
a.
I I
CO
V = 3 , C = 4
1 0.675
2 0.900
3 0.975
4 1.000
Idealized Curve
1 2 3 4
H Q 0 Q
CHARACTERS
LOGIC VALUES
2= • 1= El 0= Q
TRUTH
TABLE
EVENT - VERSUS - EVENT MATRIX
An idealized illustration of multi-valued logic is shown. In this example, four characters
having 3-valued logic (34=81 patterns) are listed in the truth table at the left. These could
represent 81 unique possible patterns of events. The event-versus-event matrix lists the com-
parison of every pair of patterns. When values for a given variable' differ, the two events
are separable or disjoint. In this ideal case, all pairs of patterns (events) are separable.
The progressively smaller squares within the matrix represent the numbers of pairs separated
by each variable conditionally independent of the other variables. The idealized curve for
the percent separation of pairs, calculated using the general equation, is shown in the Table.
Real data, clustered by the truth table method shown in Table 13, are made to approximate the
ideal curve as closely as possible.
*Rypka, E. W. Pattern Recognition as a Method of Studying Host-Parasite Interaction.
1972 International Conference on Cybernetics and Society, Washington, D.C.
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APPENDIX B
CLUSTER ANALYSIS AND PATTERN RECOGNITION -
DETERMINATIVE AND IDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGY
The theoretical aspects of separation and partitioning of
events are shown in Table 14. The truth table shown at the left
consists of four 3-state variables (3 =81 possible patterns of
results). Each row is compared with every other row, and the
variable(s) that separate(s) a given pair of rows (events)
(actually the event's "partitioning variables") is recorded in
the "event-versus-event" matrix. In this case there are e(e-l)/2
(e=event) or 81(80)/2 = 3240 pairs of events to separate. We
wish to analyze the next event in terms of optimal selection of
variables so that an identification can be made in the most
accurate, systematic, rapid and economical manner.
The general identification equation is:
S = [1 - v~k]/[l - v-c]
S = separation value for the variable
v = state or value of logic (3 in this case)
k = kth character or variable
c = number of characters or variables
An example of the equation is used in Figure 11. It is necessary
next to select variables (for example, from Matrix C and Matrix F,
Table 13) so that the pairs of events are separated at a rate that
most closely approximates the general case. To do this, variables
are selected in sequence so that the first variable separates the
most pairs. The second variable separates the most pairs condi-
tionally independent of the first selected variable, etc. Ideally
every combination of variable, Cn, should be tested but hardware
limitations soon become evident because of the large number of
combinations to be studied. The empirically determined variable
selection and rate of separation of pairs of events for Matrix C
of Table 13 are shown in Table 15.
When sufficient data become available, it is then possible
to assume that each variable is statistically independent of the
others and, with optimal selection of variables as just discussed,
to calculate the likelihood for each pattern of variables. This
provides a basis for predicting the likelihood of human error-
related events for patterns of various states of variables. It
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% s
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
S=Separation value (pairs
of events separated)
v=logic value
c=number of characters
k=kth character
1 3 4 2
Variables
General Identification Equation
S = [l-v-k]/[l-v-c]
v=3, c=4
Theoretical* Matrix C*m
0.675
0.900
0.975
1.000
0.718
0.910
0.952
0.987
*Table 14 illustrates an ideal case.
Figure 11. The theoretical rate of separation or partitioning
of events and separation based upon data in Matrix C of Table 13.
Variables selected to separate events that most closely fit the
theoretical curve means identification of future events is being
done at the fastest rate.
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TABLE 15
10
11
3
9
7
4
13
12
6
\
3 4
3 4
1
3 4
3 4
1 2
1 2
1 2
3 4
1 2
4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3
2
3 4
EVENT -VERSUS -EVENT MATRIX
\
4
1
3 4
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
4
1 2
3
1 2
1 2
4
1 2
4
2
4
\
1
3
3
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
1 2
3 4
1 2
4
1 2
1 2
4
2
\\
1
2
3 4
2
3 4
1 2
3
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3
2
3 4
1 2
3
\\
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 .
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3
1 2
3 4
2
3
\\
1
3 4
1 2
4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
2
3
1 2
3 4
\\
1
3 4
1 2
4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
2
3
1 2
3 4
\\
2
3 4
2
4
2
1 2
4
1 2
\\
\
3 \
\
34 4 \
i i i \
34 4 4 \
1 1 1 1 N V
3 4 4 4 X
10 11 13 12
Variable selection in an event-versus-event matrix. Data are
from Matrix C, Table 13. Each event in the matrix is compared
with every other event. Variable states that separate events
are entered in the squares in this table. Variable selection
for identification is done so that the first best variable is
the one separating the most pairs of events. The second vari-
able is the one separating the most pairs of events conditionally
independent of the first variable, etc. This optimal partition-
ing is shown in Figure 11.
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also allows for avoiding and for correcting against combinations
of variable states, based upon previous experience, that were
present in accidents and have a high likelihood of occurrence.
To illustrate this method, using variables from our data set,
four variables were selected from the matrix of the 56 non-
training/non-midair accidents found in Figure 4. (The method is
also illustrated elsewhere in this report on critical element
data.)
Table 16 summarizes the steps taken in computing separation
or partitioning information on the 49 variables. The number of
logic states for each variable in Table 16, over the 56 events,
is listed. Five-valued logic (1 through 5, in descending value
of logic) was used. Logic states "8" ("not applicable") and "9"
("no data") were omitted from the calculation of the S value for
each variable. The value S represents the number of pairs of
events a given variable will separate. The lower two lines in
the table list the variables rearranged in descending order of
their S values. Arbitrarily, the first four variables (numbers 03,
16, 17 and 18), in 3-valued logic, are selected to illustrate the
capability of predicting "likely and unlikely" combinations of
variable states (patterns), based on accumulated data. The
variables selected are listed below:
Variable Logic Value
03 Phase of operation Landing 1
Approach 2
Departure 3*
16 Total flight time Under 3500 1
3500 - 10,000 2
Over 10,000 3
17 Hours in type 0 - 500 1
(Captain) 501 - 2000 2
Over 2000 3
18 Hours in type 0 - 500 1
(First Officer) 501 - 2000 2
Over 2000 3
*In this example, "3" includes inflight, departure,
takeoff to first power reduction and static/ramp.
From the summary of the data set in Table 16, the frequency of
occurrence of the states for the variable are:
Logic State Variable
03 16 17 18
1
2
3
0.429*
0.250
0.321
0.250
0.339
0.411
0.327
0.454
0.218
0.473
0.400
0.127
*NI/NI N2
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Then, the likelihood of the following patterns of variable states
would be:
Logic State Pattern
Frequency
Variable
03 16 17 18
3 1 3 3
(0. 321) x (0. 250) x(0. 218)x (0.127)
Likelihood Normalized*
0.0022218 0.0554274
Logic State Pattern
Frequency
1 3 2 1
(0. 429) x (0. 411)x(0. 454)x (0.473) 0.0378630 0.9445725
Sum 0.0400848
*By dividing the likelihood by the sum of likelihoods.
From the preceding normalized likelihoods the inference would be
made that variable states pattern 1, 3, 2, 1 for the four vari-
ables 03, 16, 17 and 18 has a high likelihood of occurrence and
that the information in this pattern should be further investi-
gated.
In summary, by clustering, optimally selecting variables,
and calculating likelihood, it is possible, using real data sets
to gain insight into combination of variable states, to determine
likely and unlikely combinations thus providing some degree of
predictability to pilot error-related aircraft accidents.
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